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1 
Abstract  
This paper shows how securitization changes the linkages and the systemic risks in the 
regulated and unregulated “shadow” banking system. The theoretical framework includes 
an analysis of the transfer of idiosyncratic, systematic and systemic risks and the use of 
the proceeds from the transfer. The incentives of regulated banks to securitize and transfer 
risks to the shadow banking system and the implications for financial stability are 
discussed. The empirical analysis shows that securitization is associated with (i) increased 
connectedness of banks and (ii) increased systemic risk exposure of banks. Both the 
theoretical and the empirical analysis identify decreased risks on average but increased 
systemic risks that are most likely hidden and falsely interpreted as resilience. The results 
suggest that more research on the size and the risks of the shadow banking system is 
warranted. 
2 
1 Introduction 
The “shadow” banking system poses a potential risk to the stability of the financial system 
since it is opaque and regulatory authorities do not know precisely how large the shadow 
banking system (SBS) actually is (e.g. see Bundesbank, 2014, ECB, 2012, Financial 
Stability Board, 2014a). Moreover, it is not clear how the shadow banking system is linked 
to the regulated banking system both in normal times and in periods of turmoil and 
financial instability. Securitization of loans in the regulated banking system and the risk 
transfer to the unregulated, shadow banking system creates or increases linkages between 
the two systems (e.g. Pozsar and Singh, 2011) which can increase the risks in the entire 
system. 
A recent paper (Acharya et al. 2013), however, suggests that securitization did not always 
lead to a risk transfer. In contrast, securitization led to more risk and concentration of 
risk. The authors also show that financial regulation incentivized regulatory arbitrage and 
thus securitization.  An alternative view is that securitization is not initiated by the 
regulated banking sector but by the shadow banking system which demanded securitized 
“safe” assets (e.g. Gennaioli et al., 2013 and Gorton and Metrick, 2010).  
We first show theoretically that diversification of risks within the regulated banking system 
leads to increased connectedness of banks which reduce the benefits of both diversification 
and risk transfer. Hence, diversification of and the transfer of risks outside the regulated 
banking system appears to be a superior alternative. Indeed, if the risks are transferred 
to outside market participants that are not (yet) connected to the banking system, the 
banking system may be more stable. However, this perspective with a focus on the overall 
stability of the banking system does not explain why individual banks transferred the risks 
to entities outside the regulated banking system. The demand for securitized “safe” assets 
(see Gorton and Metrick, 2010) suggests that the entities in the shadow banking system 
were willing to pay more for the securitized assets than the regulated banking system. 
Regulatory arbitrage further incentivized banks to diversify and transfer the risks outside 
the regulated banking system (Acharya et al. 2013). 
Whilst the diversification of risks among a larger group of entities including the shadow 
banking system appears to be a dominant strategy both for individual banks and from a 
macro perspective, it is arguably more difficult to monitor and control such a larger 
system. This is particularly true if the risks are (deliberately) hidden, if there are 
concentrations of risk, or if the interactions of risks with other risk factors are hidden and 
not well understood. 
We use a theoretical framework to describe the dynamics in the financial system 
associated with securitization, diversification and the transfer of risk. We distinguish 
between idiosyncratic, systematic and systemic risk transfers and show that the type of 
risk that is transferred has fundamental implications for the overall risk in the system .  
Furthermore, we discuss the question if two banking systems with the major difference 
that one system is regulated and partially protected by the state and the other system is 
not regulated can co-exist and neither system does jeopardize the stability of the other or 
the entire financial system.  
The empirical analysis is based on the most active banks and financial institutions in 
securitizations and thus the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and covered bonds (CB) over the last 25 years.  We find that 
securitization is associated with the increased connectedness of regulated banks and of 
regulated banks with the unregulated “shadow” banking system. Moreover, we find clear 
differences among banks and the influence of securitizations through the sale of ABS, MBS 
and CBs.  Finally, securitizations influence systemic risks measured through co-
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exceedances of bank equity returns. MBS tend to increase systemic risks whilst ABS tend 
to decrease them. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section I theoretically analyzes the implications of 
securitization and risk transfer on the regulated and unregulated “shadow” banking 
system. The analysis distinguishes between idiosyncratic, systematic and systemic risk 
transfer within the regulated banking system and to the unregulated banking system. 
Section II presents an empirical analysis of the banks that were most active in the 
securitization of loans especially prior to the global financial crisis in 2008. Section III 
summarizes the main findings and provides concluding remarks. 
 
2 Theoretical Background 
In this section we describe the effects of securitization with and without risk transfer for 
two banks within the regulated banking system and then extend the example to the 
shadow banking system with one bank in the regulated banking system and one “bank” 
or financial institution in the shadow banking system. We first follow Baur and Joossens 
(2006) but update and extend their modelling framework significantly.  
2.1 Banks contract and share risks 
Assume that there are two banks A and B that face default if all assets are lost with a 
probability of p=0.1. The two banks and their losses are assumed to be independent of 
each other. The possible losses and probabilities are presented in Table A below. 
 
Table A: Two banks with no linkage 
 Loss B 
0 100 
Loss A 
0 0.92 0.1·0.9 
100 0.1·0.9 0.12 
 
If bank A and B transfer risk to each other and thus share risks, they create a link and 
become endogenously connected represented by the correlation coefficient ρ. The effects 
are presented in Table B for the case that both bank A and B transfer 50% of their assets 
to the other bank. Hence, if bank A suffers a loss of 100 that would have led to a default 
of bank A without risk sharing, the loss is shared among both banks A and B leading to a 
loss of 50 for bank A and a loss of 50 for bank B. The probability of this event is given by 
0.1·0.9 (1-ρ). Since bank B also transfers 50% of its potential losses to bank A, the case 
(50, 50) occurs with probability 2·0.1·0.9 (1-ρ). The risk transfer implies a positive 
correlation ρ since any loss that occurs at either bank A or B is a joint event and not 
independent as assumed in Table A. 
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Table B: Two banks with risk sharing and linkage 
 Loss B 
0 50 100 
 
Loss A 
0 0.92 + ρ·0.1·0.9   
50  2·0.1·0.9 (1-ρ)  
100   0.12 + ρ·0.1·0.9 
 
Note that for ρ=0, the joint probabilities of “no default” and “default” do not change. 
However, the events (0/ 100) and (100/ 0) in Table 1 are transformed into (50, 50) in 
Table B. For ρ > 0, the probabilities of the extreme cases (no default and joint default) 
increase whilst the probability of the “intermediate” case (50/ 50) decreases. For high 
linkages between bank A and B and ρ = 1 the “intermediate” scenario even disappears 
and there are only two “extreme” events with a positive probability, the events (0/ 0) and 
(100/ 100). The increasing linkages essentially increase the probability mass of the events 
“no loss” and “joint losses”. Note that the correlations are endogenous in the sense that 
they are the result of the diversification and the transfer of risks. 
In a next step, we assume that banks A and B do not symmetrically share the losses but 
that only bank A transfers some of its risks to bank B. If we assume that a bank only 
defaults if it loses more than 50% of its assets, the assumptions shown in Table C would 
lead to the default of only one bank (bank B) even in extreme events with low probability 
for the loss pair (50/ 150). In other words, the systemic risk of a joint default is reduced 
through the risk transfer from bank A to bank B. 
 
Table C: Two banks with asymmetric risk sharing 
 Loss B 
0 75 150 
 
Loss A 
0 0.92 + ρ·0.1·0.9   
25  2·0.1·0.9 (1-ρ)  
50   0.12 + ρ·0.1·0.9 
 
One crucial assumption that will play an important role below is that bank A is not 
reinvesting the proceeds of the risk transfer, i.e. from the sale of its assets. If we relax 
this strong assumption and assume that bank A reinvested the proceeds, the potential 
losses of bank A would change from the set (0; 25; 50) to (0; 50; 100). The aggregate 
losses could increase and the correlations between the two banks could also increase if 
they both invested in the same asset (e.g. an asset-backed security) and thus were 
exposed to the same risk factors. 
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2.2 Introduction of the shadow banking system 
We now make a fundamental change to the modelling framework and assume that there 
is a large bank A which is part of the regulated banking sector and the shadow banking 
system which is substituted for bank B in the previous examples. If bank A transfers 50% 
of its assets and thus risks to the shadow banking system, the outcomes can be displayed 
as in Table D. Table D assumes for simplicity that the shadow banking system carries no 
prior or additional risks.  
 
Table D: Bank A transfers 50% of its risks to the Shadow Banking System 
 Loss Shadow Banking System (SBS) 
0 25  50 
Loss A 
0 0.92 + ρ·0.1·0.9   
25  2·0.1·0.9 (1-ρ)  
50   0.12 + ρ·0.1·0.9 
 
Table D shows that the aggregate losses of the SBS are given by losses of bank A (25 or 
50) depend on the risk transfer to the SBS. Since bank A transfers 50% of its assets to a 
system and not a single financial intermediary, it is possible that the aggregate risks are 
smaller because the risks are shared within the system consisting of many different entities 
with ideally low concentrations of risks. Hence, the aggregate losses will be lower. More 
formally, this could be expressed by a variable c that is subtracted from the potential 
losses of the SBS, e.g. (25 – c) and (50 – c). If there are significant concentrations of risk 
with additional side effects this could be modelled with a negative c. In other words, the 
risk-sharing and risk-bearing capacity of a system represented by the SBS is potentially 
larger than that of a single bank which makes the entire system comprised of a regulated 
bank and the shadow banking system more stable, at least theoretically. However, the 
loss probabilities, again, depend on the linkages between bank A and the shadow banking 
system. If both bank A and the SBS depend on the same risk factors, ρ can be high and 
close to one which increases the likelihood of extreme events. Since there is also a high 
probability of no losses, especially for ρ equal to one or close to one, the system may 
appear stable even though the probability of an extreme negative event is significantly 
higher compared to a case in which there are no linkages between the entities of the two 
systems, i.e. the regulated banking system represented by bank A and the SBS.  It is, of 
course, also possible that the risk transfer from bank A to the SBS does not increase the 
correlations due to the larger number of entities making up the SBS and less risk 
concentration in the SBS. An interesting case is obtained for negative correlations ρ. A 
negative ρ decreases the probabilities of the extreme scenarios including the extreme loss 
event and increases the probabilities of the intermediate loss cases. This probability shift 
could be beneficial for regulatory authorities and ultimately financial stability as it would 
not indicate a false resilience covering increased systemic risks. In this case, risk transfer 
could be more efficient from a macro perspective. The risk transfer can also be more 
efficient from an individual bank’s perspective as the SBS generally pays more for 
securitized “riskless” assets and thus makes risk transfer more profitable for the regulated 
banks. It is important to note that there are two different views on the incentives for 
securitization of regulated banks. Gennaioli et al. (2013) argue that securitization is driven 
by the demand for “riskless” assets of the SBS (see also Gorton and Metrick, 2012) whilst 
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Acharya et al. (2013) argue that regulatory arbitrage of the regulated banks is driving 
securitization. Hence, the former assumes that securitization is essentially caused by the 
SBS whilst the latter assumes that securitization is initiated and thus caused by the 
regulated banking system. It is noteworthy, however, that both views can co-exist 
establishing bidirectional causality. 
 
2.3 Introduction of the shadow banking system 
Table D implicitly assumes that bank A is not reinvesting the proceeds from the sale of its 
assets to the SBS. If we assume that bank A is investing the proceeds in the market, the 
potential losses of bank A would exceed 50 and the correlations between bank A and the 
SBS increased if they invested in the same assets. The loss probabilities would also be 
different depending on the type of assets that are sold by bank A to the SBS. If bank A 
sold an asset similar to a “senior loss piece”, i.e. an asset with a low probability of default 
but if it kept the most risky part of the assets, the extreme events could become more 
severe in terms of the magnitude of the losses whilst the probabilities for such extreme 
events would remain low. Table F presents such a case in which bank A only sells assets 
with a low probability of default, i.e. bank A transfers systemic risks, and keeps the assets 
with a higher probability of default, i.e. bank A keeps idiosyncratic risks.1  
 
Table E: Systemic risk transfer without reinvestment 
 Loss Shadow Banking System 
0 0 50 
 
Loss A 
0 0.92 + ρ·0.1·0.9   
50  2·0.1·0.9 (1-ρ)  
0   0.12 + ρ·0.1·0.9 
 
If we assume that bank A’s idiosyncratic risk is also transferred to the SBS and reinvested 
in systemic risks the potential losses for bank A would be 50 with low probability 0.12 + 
ρ·0.1·0.9 and the losses for the SBS would be 50 with (intermediate) probability 2·0.1 0.9 
(1-ρ). The set of losses for bank A and the SBS would change from (0; 50; 0) and (0; 0; 
50) to (0; 0; 50) and (0; 50; 50), respectively. This scenario illustrates how the transfer 
of idiosyncratic risks (e.g. the sale of loan portfolios with a relatively high risk of default) 
and the reinvestment in systemic risks (e.g. in senior loss tranches of securitized assets) 
can increase both the probability and the severity of losses. More specifically, the severity 
of the losses could increase from 100 to 150. 
An alternative scenario with a similar outcome is a process of continued origination of 
loans with idiosyncratic and systematic risks. This process would lead to a diversified 
portfolio of idiosyncratic risks with no exposure to idiosyncratic risks but full exposure to 
systematic risk. Since systematic risk includes systemic risks (see also Das and Uppal, 
2004) , such a system of diversification would also lead to increased systemic risks with 
no idiosyncratic risks. Interestingly, this result is independent of the transfer of systemic 
risks during the origination of idiosyncratic risks. In other words, diversification through 
                                           
1 Gennaioli et al. (2013) assume that the banks sell idiosyncratic risks. 
 7 
 
the securitization of idiosyncratic risks transfers risks from a high-frequency/ low-severity 
event to a low-frequency/ high-severity event.  
Note that the transfer of idiosyncratic risk per se does not necessarily enhance the 
resiliency and stability of the financial system but rather provides the transferring 
institution with incentives or signals that are potentially detrimental to financial stability. 
First, if the proceeds of the transfer are reinvested, the risk increases due to the increased 
linkages and thus probabilities of joint losses. Only if the risk is transferred to relatively 
unconnected market participants without significantly changing the connectedness the risk 
sharing can enhance financial stability. 
Finally, Acharya et al. (2013) show that many banks did not transfer the (idiosyncratic) 
risks but instead kept the risks through guarantees and reinvested the proceeds of the 
sale into risky assets “leveraging up” and increasing their systematic and ultimately 
systemic exposure to risks. These effects are presented in Table F.  
 
Table F: Sale of assets without risk transfer and reinvestment of proceeds 
 Loss Shadow Banking System 
0 0  (50)  
 
Loss A 
0 0.92 + ρ·0.1·0.9   
0  2·0.1·0.9 (1-ρ)  
100 + (50)   0.12 + ρ·0.1·0.9 
 
Table F shows the increase of potential losses if bank A leverages its systematic exposure 
through an investment of the proceeds of securitization (50) without the actual transfer 
of risk. The potential loss in the SBS is displayed in parenthesis to indicate that any loss 
is fully borne by bank A. Hence, the table aims to illustrate that bank A borrows from the 
SBS (50) using securitized assets as collateral without any true risk transfer implying a 
potential loss of 150 for bank A. Note that the table could also be expressed using only 
bank A with a no loss event with probability 0.92 + 0.1·0.9 and a loss event with probability 
0.12 + 0.1·0.9.  
Greenwood et al. (2014) describe an alternative propagation channel that involves fire 
sales. Fire sales can depress prices and contaminate seemingly unrelated assets and 
seemingly unrelated institutions. In the words by Shleifer and Vishny (2011): “A bank that 
simply suffers large losses may be forced to reduce its risk by selling assets at distressed 
or fire-sale prices. If other banks must revalue their assets at these temporarily low market 
values, the first sale can set off a cascade of fire sales that inflicts losses on many 
institutions. Thus, whether through defaults or fire sales, one troubled bank can damage 
many others, reducing the financial system’s capacity to bear risk and make loans.” Fire 
sales are not a specific problem of the SBS but are more likely to occur in the SBS due to 
its reliance on the repo market (e.g. see Gorton, 2009). Hanson et al. (2015) summarize 
the difference as follows: “traditional banks have a stable source of funding, while shadow 
banks are subject to runs and fire-sale losses.” Fire sales also explain why securitization 
without actual risk transfer can lead to a systemic crisis similar to the one experienced in 
late 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  
Table F is silent about the potential losses of the SBS due to fire sales caused by large 
losses of bank A. To some degree this reflects the situation prior to the global financial 
crisis in which risks seemed to be fully diversified and generally low. It is well possible that 
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some types of risk transfers or the implicit guarantees extended by the originators of the 
loans were not known, opaque or “neglected”. In that case Table F may have 
(misleadingly) resembled Table D where risks are seemingly diversified and shared.  
To conclude, the transfer of risk is not the problem per se but the linkages created by the 
transfer of risk and the reinvestment of the proceeds. The increased linkages and 
reinvestments raise the overall risks in the entire financial system, the probability and the 
severity of extreme losses. A key to a more stable and truly resilient system is a system 
with less diversification and thus lower linkages since for very high linkages the system 
appears stable but in fact only hides the extreme risks. 
 
3 Hypotheses and empirical implications 
The theoretical description of the effects of securitization and risk transfer shows that the 
linkages of the involved entities increase with securitizations, that the exposure to 
systematic risk increases if idiosyncratic risks are sold, diversified away or if the proceeds 
from a risk transfer are invested in assets with systematic risk exposure and that systemic 
risks increase with securitizations. Given these three theoretical implications, we can 
derive three hypotheses that can be tested empirically.  
H1: Securitization increases the linkages among banks  
H2: Securitization increases the exposure of banks to systematic risks 
H3: Securitization increases systemic risks  
Hypothesis 1 aims to test the influence of securitizations on the linkages among banks. As 
a measure for linkages we use the cross-sectional dispersion of bank equity returns as it 
is an instantaneous measure and can be calculated for each month and for all banks. In a 
market model framework increased correlations imply similar and thus less dispersed 
returns, i.e. a bank beta closer to one. The econometric model is based on the cross-
sectional dispersion of bank returns (disp) and the relationship to the issuances of 
securitized assets. 
 
dispt =  β dispt-1 + Ʃi γi log Issuancei,t + εt     (1) 
 
where log Issuance is the aggregate issuance of securitization type ABS (i=1), MBS (i=2) 
and CB (i=3) for each month t. The error term ε includes the dispersion of bank return 
that is not explained by its own lag and the log issuances. If securitization and thus the 
issuance of asset-backed securities indeed increases the linkages (and decreases the 
dispersion of returns) among banks or financial institutions in general, the coefficient for 
the issuance type is expected to be negative, i.e. H0: γi < 0. Since there are significant 
qualitative differences between ABS, MBS and CB issuances, we expect different results 
for the hypothesis tests based on γi . 
Hypothesis 2 tests if the banks’ exposure to systematic risk increases with securitization. 
The econometric model is given by equation (2) as follows: 
 
rmt =  β rmWt + Ʃi δi rmWt log Issuancei,t + εt    (2) 
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where rm is the average bank return and rmW is the global market return. If 
securitizations increase systematic risk exposure proxied by rmW and measured by β the 
interaction term of the market return with the log issuances should have a positive impact 
on the returns of banks. Hence, the formal hypothesis test is H0: δi > 0. Equation 2 can 
also be used to test if the aggregate and outstanding issuances have an influence on the 
returns of the banks if the second term is not an interaction variable but only includes the 
log issuances. 
Finally, hypothesis 3 focuses on systemic risks using co-exceedances.2 We calculate the 
exceedance for each bank and time t below a certain threshold τ and obtain a time-series 
of co-exceedances denoted by Φ.3 If the number of co-exceedances increases with the 
aggregate securitization activities of banks, there is evidence of increased systemic risk, 
i.e. extreme joint co-movements of banks’ equity returns. The econometric model is given 
by equation (3) below. 
 
Φ(τ)t =  βrmt + Ʃi γi log Issuancei,t + εt    (3) 
 
where Φ(τ)t is the co-exceedance conditional on a threshold (quantile) τ at time t. The 
formal test is based on H0: γi > 0. If γ is positive issuances increase systemic risks. 
 
4 Empirical analysis 
This section presents the empirical analysis. It consists of a description of the data followed 
by the presentation and discussion of the estimation results based on the econometric 
models and the associated hypotheses described in the theoretical section above. 
4.1. Data 
We obtain asset-backed securities from DCM published by Thomson Dealogic. We select 
all deals between 1990 and November 2015 and require deals in our sample to report Deal 
Type is “Asset-Backed Security”, “Mortgage Backed Security”, or “Covered Bonds” and 
Deal Cancelled Date is empty. We download observations at tranche level, so that we keep 
tranche level information such as the pricing and rating. The sample includes 158,431 
tranches, and 65,200 deals of which 20,807 deals are Asset-Backed Securities (31.91%), 
19,898 Mortgage-Back Securities (30.52%) and 24,495 covered bonds (37.57%). The 
total amount in 2015 constant US dollars in the whole period 1990-2015 is $12.9 trillion 
(ABS), $18.1 trillion (MBS), and $7.5 trillion (Covered bonds). 
Each deal reports issuers and bookrunners. The bookrunner is the lead bank of the deal 
which is in contact with the issuer and searches for bond buyers. The dataset reports no 
information about institutions purchasing the deals. Nevertheless, for agency problems 
                                           
2 The concept of co-exceedances in the context of changes of linkages and contagion was introduced by Bae, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2003).  
3 If the 1% quantile threshold of a bank’s equity returns is -5%, all events at which the equity return at t is below 
the -5% threshold is defined as an exceedance. Since such exceedances generally occur at different points in 
time exceedances can also be presented as a time-series. Similarly, the joint exceedance of two bank equity 
returns at time t (e.g. at time t* both bank A equity return is below its 1% quantile threshold and bank B equity 
return is below its 1% quantile threshold) forms a time-series of co-exceedances. Exceedances and co-
exceedances can be defined for quantiles, e.g. the 1% quantile for each series, or for absolute values such as 
the -5% return.  
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bookrunners typically hold a large share of the bonds so that risk sharing mechanisms 
prevent bookrunners from shirking efforts in producing information and pricing. We thus 
assume that bookrunners bear a large share of the credit risk of the bond. The amount 
retained after bond issuance is never reported in the data. Yet, it is standard practice in 
league table construction to assign the whole deal value to the bookrunner.4 The lead bank 
ensures the liquidity of the security through dealing by holding a large share of the 
issuance. Bookrunners represent the system and capture the extent to which the risk is 
passed to the system. 
In our sample, each of the 158,431 tranches report a unique issuer, of which 53,184 also 
report a unique originator. Nevertheless, of these 53,184 tranches, 46,867 (88%) report 
the same name for the issuer and the originator. Originators of a deal are the institutions 
which provided the loans (e.g., mortgage and car loans) and are selling to the special 
purpose vehicle. The issuer is the institution which “buys” the loans from the originator 
and creates a separate entity – the SPV – which backs up the loan purchase with bond 
issuance. As numbers tell in most cases, originators set up the SPV and are responsible 
for the bond payments (just like any bond issuer). Through manual check we noticed that 
whenever issuer and originator names did not match, the issuer was a separate entity of 
the originating institution, we decided to substitute all issuer names with the originator 
name whenever the originator name was not missing. The name of the issuer was thus 
substituted for 6,317 tranches which represents about 4% of the sample. 
Table 1 shows the total amount of the top 50 issuers in volumes (current dollars) in the 
period 2000-2015. There is clearly a strong concentration at the top end, with 7 banks 
issuing nearly half of the whole amount. Remarkably, the group of banks shown in the 
table issued nearly 100% of the market. Top issuers are the US housing state agencies, 
namely Freddie Mac (rank: 1) and Fannie Mae (rank: 2) which totaled more than a fifth of 
the market. This reflects the driving force of the US housing market in asset-backed 
securities markets. Noticeably there are also non-banking core business companies like 
Porsche Automobile and General Electric but with market shares lower than 1%. 
Table 2 reports the total amount of the top 50 bookrunners of the market in the period 
2000-2015. Bookrunning is also relatively concentrated. Six banks only have arranged 
more than 50% of the bond issuances in the period, with a total amount of $14.7 trillion. 
With no surprise, investment banks lead the table. 
  
                                           
4 Whenever DCM reports several bookrunners we select the first bank in the list. Indeed, the first listed bank is 
the lead bank of the pool of banks and will benefit the most from private information and will provide most of 
the support to the issuing company. 
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Table 1: Sample description: Issuers. The table reports the top 50 issuers of securitized assets bonds 
in the period 2000-2015, asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities, and covered bonds 
issued. 
Issuer Volume $bn Rank 
Markets 
share 
Cumulative 
Market Share 
Freddie Mac 2,255 1 12.38 12.32 
Fannie Mae 1,830 2 10.04 22.31 
Bank of America 1,438 3 7.89 30.16 
JPMorgan 1,133 4 6.22 36.35 
Ginnie Mae 1,122 5 6.16 42.47 
Santander 638 6 3.50 45.96 
Ally Financial Inc 592 7 3.25 49.19 
Lloyds Banking Group 582 8 3.20 52.37 
Wells Fargo 482 9 2.65 55.00 
Lehman Brothers 466 10 2.55 57.55 
Royal Bank of Scotland 439 11 2.41 59.94 
Credit Suisse 406 12 2.23 62.16 
Citibank 387 13 2.12 64.27 
Commerzbank 373 14 2.05 66.31 
Morgan Stanley 327 15 1.79 68.09 
UniCredit 275 16 1.51 69.59 
BPCE 262 17 1.44 71.02 
Barclays 260 18 1.43 72.44 
SLM Corp 250 19 1.37 73.81 
Goldman Sachs 246 20 1.35 75.15 
Deutsche Bank 245 21 1.34 76.49 
LBBW 217 22 1.19 77.67 
BBVA 216 23 1.18 78.85 
Japan Housing Finance Agency 210 24 1.15 80.00 
NordLB 210 25 1.15 81.14 
Ford Motor Co 198 26 1.09 82.23 
UK Asset Resolution Ltd 192 27 1.06 83.28 
CIT Group Inc 180 28 0.99 84.26 
La Caixa 175 29 0.96 85.22 
CECA 164 30 0.90 86.11 
BFA Tenedora de Acciones SA 150 31 0.82 86.93 
UBS 147 32 0.81 87.73 
Rabobank 142 33 0.78 88.51 
HSBC 139 34 0.76 89.27 
ABN AMRO 136 35 0.75 90.01 
ING 135 36 0.74 90.75 
Nationwide Building Society 134 37 0.73 91.48 
Helaba 131 38 0.72 92.19 
Capital One Financial Corp 129 39 0.71 92.90 
General Electric Co 127 40 0.70 93.59 
Caisse Francaise de Financement Local 125 41 0.68 94.27 
Porsche Automobil 120 42 0.66 94.93 
BayernLB 120 43 0.66 95.59 
Intesa Sanpaolo 113 44 0.62 96.21 
BNP Paribas 105 45 0.58 96.78 
Aareal Bank AG 103 46 0.56 97.34 
Korea Housing Finance Corp 102 47 0.56 97.90 
Banco de Sabadell SA 102 48 0.56 98.46 
Dexia 102 49 0.56 99.02 
Westpac 91 50 0.50 99.51 
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Table 2: Sample description: bookrunners. The table reports the top 50 bookrunners of securitized 
assets bonds in the period 2000-2015. Securitized assets bonds include asset-backed securities, 
mortgage-backed securities, and covered bonds. We assign the whole bond amounts to lead 
bookrunners. 
Bookrunner Volume  $bn Rank 
Market 
share 
Cumulated 
Market Share 
Barclays 3,166 1 11.4 11.4 
Bank of America 3,031 2 11 22.4 
JPMorgan 2,764 3 10 32.4 
Royal Bank of Scotland 2,004 4 7.2 39.7 
Citibank 1,934 5 7 46.6 
Credit Suisse 1,761 6 6.4 53 
Deutsche Bank 1,617 7 5.8 58.9 
Goldman Sachs 1,145 8 4.1 63 
Morgan Stanley 1,090 9 3.9 66.9 
UBS 843 10 3 70 
BNP Paribas 648 11 2.3 72.3 
Wells Fargo 554 12 2 74.3 
Commerzbank 405 13 1.5 75.8 
Lloyds Banking Group 350 14 1.3 77.1 
Nomura 337 15 1.2 78.3 
Santander 329 16 1.2 79.5 
Credit Agricole 316 17 1.1 80.6 
HSBC 282 18 1 81.6 
UniCredit 229 19 0.8 82.5 
BBVA 214 20 0.8 83.2 
LBBW 184 21 0.7 83.9 
Intesa Sanpaolo 175 22 0.6 84.5 
Natixis 171 23 0.6 85.2 
BayernLB 163 24 0.6 85.7 
NordLB 147 25 0.5 86.3 
SG  142 26 0.5 86.8 
ABN AMRO 137 27 0.5 87.3 
Rabobank 132 28 0.5 87.8 
RBC Capital Markets 127 29 0.5 88.2 
Bankia 111 30 0.4 88.6 
Helaba 107 31 0.4 89 
Mizuho 103 32 0.4 89.4 
ING 93 33 0.3 89.7 
CaixaBank 90 34 0.3 90 
Daiwa Securities 88 35 0.3 90.4 
DZ Bank 81 36 0.3 90.7 
Dexia 79 37 0.3 90.9 
Jefferies LLC 72 38 0.3 91.2 
Danske Bank 64 39 0.2 91.4 
Macquarie Group 62 40 0.2 91.7 
DekaBank 57 41 0.2 91.9 
Mitsubishi UFJ Group 57 42 0.2 92.1 
Westpac 56 43 0.2 92.3 
Banco de Sabadell SA 50 44 0.2 92.4 
Banco Popular Espanol SA 49 45 0.2 92.6 
KDB Daewoo Securities 48 46 0.2 92.8 
Commonwealth Bank Australia 45 47 0.2 93 
ANZ 44 48 0.2 93.1 
HSH Nordbank 44 49 0.2 93.3 
DNB Markets 41 50 0.1 93.4 
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4.2. Descriptive Analysis 
Table 3 presents the list of banks that are used to test the effects of securitization and the 
descriptive statistics of the banks’ equity returns over a 25-year sample period from 1990 
– 2015. 
 
Table 3: Sample description: combining bookrunning and issued amounts. The table ranks the 28 
banks in our sample which are both among top 50 bookrunners and top 50 issuers. We calculate 
volumes as the sum of book run and issued amounts of securitized assets bonds in our sample 
(volumes are reported in Tables 7 and 8). The ranking is based on all asset-backed securities, 
mortgage-backed securities, and covered bonds issued in the period 2000-2015. Consistent with 
standard league table practice, we assign the full amount of the bond to the lead bookrunner. Market 
shares are calculated in the sub-sample of 28 banks. 
Bookruning + Issuing Amounts Volume 
$bn 
Rank Market 
Share 
Cumulative 
Market Share 
Bank of America 4469 1 13.6 13.6 
JPMorgan 3897 2 11.9 25.5 
Barclays 3426 3 10.4 36.0 
Royal Bank of Scotland 2443 4 7.5 43.4 
Citibank 2321 5 7.1 50.5 
Credit Suisse 2167 6 6.6 57.1 
Deutsche Bank 1862 7 5.7 62.8 
Morgan Stanley 1417 8 4.3 67.1 
Goldman Sachs 1391 9 4.2 71.3 
Wells Fargo 1036 10 3.2 74.5 
UBS 990 11 3.0 77.5 
Santander 967 12 2.9 80.5 
Lloyds Banking Group 932 13 2.8 83.3 
Commerzbank 778 14 2.4 85.7 
BNP Paribas 753 15 2.3 88.0 
UniCredit 504 16 1.5 89.5 
BBVA 430 17 1.3 90.8 
HSBC 421 18 1.3 92.1 
LBBW 401 19 1.2 93.3 
NordLB 357 20 1.1 94.4 
Intesa Sanpaolo 288 21 0.9 95.3 
BayernLB 283 22 0.9 96.2 
Rabobank 274 23 0.8 97.0 
ABN AMRO 273 24 0.8 97.8 
ING 228 25 0.7 98.5 
Dexia 181 26 0.6 99.1 
Banco de Sabadell SA 152 27 0.5 99.6 
Westpac 147 28 0.4 100.0 
 
The statistics display positive mean returns for all banks except for one but large extreme 
positive and negative returns for all banks.  
Figure 1 shows the average (equally-weighted) prices of all banks and the MSCI World 
equity index as a proxy for systematic risks. 
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Figure 1: Bank equity index prices and MSCI World equity index price 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that bank equity prices and global equity prices co-move in several 
periods and seem to fall jointly in the global financial crisis in 2008. Figure 2 also shows 
time-varying correlation estimates of the returns and reveals that the correlations did not 
increase but decreased and thus decoupled from each other. This finding is inconsistent 
with classical definitions of financial contagion (e.g. see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) that 
require correlations to rise to identify contagious spillovers. 
 
Figure 2: Financial Contagion: The graph shows a decreasing correlation (decoupling) between 
bank equity returns and global equity market returns around the Global Financial Crisis from July 
2007 – December 2008. The decreasing correlation in a crisis period rejects financial contagion 
defined through a crisis-specific increase in correlation. 
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Figure 3 presents the aggregate volume of asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) and covered bonds (CB) issuances, i.e. securitizations of all banks 
from 1990 to 2015. The graphs show an inverted u-shape pattern for securitizations with 
virtually no issuances before 1995, strongly rising issuances between 1995 and 2008 and 
strongly falling issuances with the onset of the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
Figure 3: Aggregate ABS, MBS and CB issuances between 1990 – 2015 
 
 
4.3. Econometric Analysis 
In this section we present the estimation results of the econometric models and their 
associated hypotheses as specified in equations (1) – (3). 
 
4.3.1. Hypothesis 1 
Figure 4 presents the plot of the cross-sectional dispersion of the bank equity returns and 
the monthly aggregate ABS, MBS and CB issuances of all banks. Visual inspection indicates 
some positive and negative relationships between the level of dispersion and aggregate 
issuances. A more systematic analysis is provided by Table 4 which shows that the cross-
sectional dispersion is persistent and that ABS exhibit a negative influence on the 
dispersion of bank equity returns whilst MBS and CB display a positive but statistically 
insignificant influence. The negative coefficient for ABS implies that ABS issuances increase 
the similarity and thus the connectedness of bank equity returns. This effect demonstrates 
that risk transfer through ABS increases the linkages of the banks whilst the issuance of 
MBS and CB do not increase the linkages. If MBS regularly did not entail an actual risk 
transfer as reported by Acharya et al. (2013) the similarity of MBS with CB is not 
surprising. 
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Figure 4: Dispersion of bank equity returns and Securitizations 
 
Table 4: Bank equity return descriptive statistics. The table reports the returns on equity of the main 
banks in our sample for both issuing and arranging securitized asset-backed securities. The 
frequency of the sample is monthly, and the period is January 1993 – November 2015. 
Ticker mean std. dev. min max skewness kurtosis 
BARC.L 0.009 0.111 -0.452 0.902 2.064 20.759 
BAC 0.007 0.110 -0.533 0.727 0.356 12.214 
JPM 0.010 0.091 -0.306 0.317 -0.191 4.290 
RBS.L 0.005 0.114 -0.623 0.706 -0.191 12.555 
C 0.008 0.120 -0.578 0.687 0.151 10.812 
CSGN.VX 0.006 0.097 -0.396 0.379 -0.007 5.293 
DBKGn.DE 0.005 0.100 -0.406 0.458 0.126 5.551 
GS 0.010 0.096 -0.277 0.312 0.194 3.777 
MS 0.012 0.109 -0.437 0.507 -0.030 5.215 
UBSG.VX 0.006 0.095 -0.422 0.491 0.181 7.263 
BNPP.PA 0.008 0.090 -0.307 0.308 -0.162 4.629 
WFC 0.012 0.081 -0.360 0.405 0.092 8.350 
CBKG.DE 0.000 0.121 -0.482 0.441 0.070 6.276 
LLOY.L 0.005 0.103 -0.357 0.584 0.588 7.374 
SAN.MC 0.009 0.090 -0.331 0.401 -0.075 5.193 
HSBA.L 0.007 0.078 -0.325 0.313 0.108 5.148 
CRDI.MI 0.004 0.105 -0.295 0.505 0.546 5.278 
BBVA.MC 0.010 0.091 -0.305 0.355 0.140 5.007 
ISP.MI 0.011 0.122 -0.323 1.071 2.363 23.394 
BLGGgi.F 0.003 0.073 -0.260 0.256 -0.322 6.478 
ING.AS 0.011 0.110 -0.515 0.708 0.116 11.232 
DEXI.F -0.013 0.178 -0.632 1.429 2.604 24.698 
WBC.AX 0.010 0.058 -0.156 0.186 -0.205 2.926 
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4.3.2. Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 tests if securitizations and issuances of a bank increase the systematic risk 
exposure of the bank. The underlying mechanism is that the issuance and thus the sale of 
assets allows the bank to reinvest the proceeds from the sale. If the bank invests the 
proceeds in a diversified portfolio the bank implicitly invests in systematic risk. In the 
context of an increasing exposure to systematic risks we first analyse the question if 
securitizations of a bank have an influence on the returns of the bank’s equity. A long-run 
perspective is provided by Figure 5. Panel A of Table 5 indicates that MBS decrease the 
returns whilst there is no statistically significant effect for ABS and CB. The results 
illustrate that MBS issuances are associated with losses that decreased the equity returns. 
Another implication of this finding is that MBS issuances did not always imply a true 
transfer of risk. 
 
Figure 5: Bank equity prices and Securitizations 
 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results based on equation (2) and shows that none of the 
three types of securitizations and issuances significantly affects the systematic risk 
exposure of the banks. This result is not surprising in light of the fact that the analysis is 
based on aggregate measures but also given the opacity of some of the deals and the size 
of the deals in the period leading up to the global financial crisis. It is well possible that 
investors did not have the information or the resources to obtain the information that was 
needed to fully understand the influence of a bank’s securitizations on the future prospect 
of the bank and thus its equity returns. In other words, securitizations and the associated 
risk transfer were opaque in many cases.5 The problem may have been more severe due 
to the fact that the financial institutions were often both issuers and bookrunners 
simultaneously.  
The findings obtained by testing Hypothesis 1 can also be interpreted as a test for the 
influence of securitization and issuances on systematic risk. Since dispersion is a measure 
of the co-movement of bank equity returns, it is a measure of systematic risk. The 
                                           
5 Opacity in market betas was recently analyzed by Gilbert et al. (2014). The issue of opacity is also related to 
neglected risk as discussed by Gennaioli et al.. (2013). 
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empirical findings derived from Hypothesis 1 therefore support Hypothesis 2 that ABS 
issuances increase systematic risks. 
Table 5: Dispersion of bank equity returns and Securitizations. Cross-sectional dispersion of monthly 
bank equity returns regressed on lagged dispersion and log ABS, MBS and CB issuances. ABS 
decrease dispersion and thus increase linkages among banks whilst there is no significant effect for 
MBS and CB. 
 
 Estimate Std. Error  t-value Pr(>|t|)     
Constant 4.166e-02   5.297e-03    7.864  <0.01 *** 
Lagged dispersion 4.290e-01 5.596e-02 7.666   <0.01 *** 
Log ABS -7.374e-13 2.637e-13 -2.797 <0.01  **  
Log MBS 8.976e-14 1.268e-13 0.708   0.47978 
Log CB 4.856e-13 3.222e-13 1.507 0.13306 
Multiple R-squared:   0.2716, Adjusted R-squared:  0.2601  
F-statistic: 23.59 on 4 and 253 DF, p-value: < 0.01 
 
4.3.3. Hypothesis 3 
Finally, we report the estimation results for hypothesis 3 which tests if securitization 
increases systemic risk. Figure 6 presents the monthly co-exceedances based on each 
bank’s equity returns for the -30% and -10% return thresholds, i.e. for each bank and 
month exceedances are calculated and summed up across all banks for each month 
resulting in a time-series of monthly co-exceedances.6 
The time-series plot illustrates that the co-exceedances are very volatile, not persistent 
and exhibit regimes consistent with volatility clustering and contagion.  
The largest co-exceedances can be observed around the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 
2008. These large co-exceedances could be associated with securitizations but there is 
also a relatively long period and regime between 2003 and 2008 in which almost no co-
exceedance occurred despite significant securitizations. The relationship between 
securitizations and co-exceedances are shown in Figure 7.  
The graphs indicate that high levels of securitizations and issuances cause extreme events, 
i.e. events in which no significant losses are incurred and events in which large losses 
must be borne. The increased probability for extreme events is a result derived in the 
theoretical section (e.g. Table B) and is fully consistent with the time-series plot. In other 
words, the apparent resiliency prior to the GFC was most likely not a sign of stability but 
a sign of increased systemic risk.  
  
                                           
6 The more standard quantile thresholds (e.g. 1%, 5% and 10%) yield similar results but the aggregate losses 
cannot be directly identified from a visual inspection which is the motivation for the usage of absolute return 
thresholds such as the -30% and -10% thresholds. 
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Figure 6: Co-exceedances: The graphs show estimates of time-varying co-exceedances/ joint 
negative returns below a certain threshold. The time-series plots indicate that the losses can be 
severe and affect a large number of banks. The largest co-exceedances can be observed for the 
year 2008. The -30% threshold implies that six banks displayed negative returns of at least -30% 
in a month in 2008. For the -10% threshold, the number of banks that suffer a 10% loss in their 
equity increases to 20. Prior to the 2008 spike in co-exceedances, there was a long period without 
any co-exceedances and thus an apparent stability and resiliency. 
  
 
Figure 7: Co-exceedances and Securitizations. The graphs present the -30% co-exceedances and 
the long-run relationship with aggregate ABS, MBS and CB issuances. High levels of securitizations 
seem to lower the risk of co-exceedances. 
 
Table 6 displays the estimation results of equation (3) for the -10% threshold and shows 
that MBS and CB tend to increase co-exceedances and thus systemic risk whilst ABS tend 
to decrease co-exceedances. One explanation for the differences is that the risk transfer 
worked for ABS but not for MBS and CB (CB does generally not involve any risk transfer). 
If the risk was not truly transferred but kept through explicit guarantees (see Acharya et 
al., 2013), it is well possible that some types of securitizations led to increased risk, MBS 
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in this case. The positive effect of CBs on co-exceedances is rather weak statistically and 
disappears if the market returns are included in the regression as shown in Panel B of the 
Table. Since CBs do not entail a risk transfer but provide new capital which can be invested 
in risky projects the positive effect is economically intuitive. The effects for ABS and MBS 
weaken through the inclusion of the market return in the regression but the signs and the 
statistical significance remain. Finally, it is remarkable that a relatively simple systemic 
risk measure such as co-exceedances replicate and thus fully support the theoretical 
findings that securitizations increase extreme events. 
 
Table 6: Bank equity returns and Securitizations 
Panel A: Does securitization affect bank equity returns? The estimates show that MBS decrease bank 
equity returns whilst ABS and CB do not influence bank equity returns. 
 
                      Estimate   Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
Constant   4.830e-03   4.306e-03 1.122  0.2631     
Market ret.  1.208e+00 5.899e-02 20.484  <0.01 *** 
Log ABS  3.543e-13 3.307e-13 1.071  0.2850     
Log MBS  -2.837e-13 1.622e-13 -1.749  0.0816 .   
Log CB   -4.780e-13 4.095e-13 -1.167  0.2442     
Multiple R-squared:  0.6468,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.6412  
F-statistic: 115.8 on 4 and 253 DF,  p-value: < 0.01 
 
Panel B: Does securitization affect exposure to systematic risks? The estimates show that 
securitizations do not significantly influence banks’ exposure to systematic risks. The strongest effect 
(albeit statistically insignificant) is found for MBS which implies an increased exposure to systematic 
risks. 
 
               Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
Constant   0.0002873 0.0025923 0.111  0.912     
Market ret.  1.2752312 0.1044557 12.208  <0.01 *** 
Rm x log(ABS)  -0.0083017 0.0076080 -1.091  0.276     
Rm x log(MBS)   0.0041719 0.0028462 1.466  0.144     
Rm x log(CB)  -0.0065913 0.0077484 -0.851  0.396     
Multiple R-squared:  0.6419, Adjusted R-squared:  0.6362  
F-statistic: 113.4 on 4 and 253 DF, p-value: < 0.01 
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Table 7: Co-exceedances and Securitizations.  
Panel A: Impact of securitizations on systemic risk. The estimates show that securitizations influence 
co-exceedances and thus systemic risks. ABS securitizations decrease co-exceedances and MBS and 
CB increase co-exceedances. The results indicate that the type of securitization and risk transfer is 
very important. 
 
                Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)    
Constant  1.304e-01 8.966e-02 1.455  0.14693    
Log ABS  -2.051e-11 6.874e-12 -2.984  0.00313 ** 
Log MBS  9.314e-12 3.381e-12 2.755  0.00630 ** 
Log CB   1.466e-11 8.547e-12 1.715  0.08756 
Multiple R-squared:  0.05759,   Adjusted R-squared:  0.0465  
F-statistic: 5.194 on 3 and 255 DF, p-value: 0.00169 
 
Panel B: Robustness 
                 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
Constant  1.769e-01 7.941e-02 2.228  0.0268 *   
Rm   -6.052e+00 7.104e-01 -8.520  <0.01  *** 
Log ABS  -1.095e-11 6.176e-12 -1.772  0.0775 .   
Log MBS   5.098e-12 3.028e-12 1.683  0.0936 .   
Log CB    9.080e-12 7.581e-12 1.198  0.2321     
Multiple R-squared:  0.2671,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.2555  
F-statistic: 23.14 on 4 and 254 DF, p-value: <0.01 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper analysed both theoretically and empirically how securitization and risk transfer 
affects the exposure of banks to bank-specific risks and market risks.  
The theoretical model shows that securitization and risk transfer of banks can create 
exposures to common risk factors increasing the linkages of the banks and the linkages 
with the market. The theoretical predictions are also confirmed empirically for a sample of 
the most active banks in securitizations and monthly issuances of securitized assets over 
a 25-year sample period from 1990 to 2015. Moreover, both the theoretical model and 
the empirical results suggest that securitization leads to increased systemic risks, i.e. large 
joint losses that occur with a low probability. The co-exceedances that are used as an 
empirical measure of systemic risk further suggest that mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
increased systemic risks whilst asset-backed securities had no impact on systemic risks.  
This result is consistent with findings in the literature that suggest that some banks did 
not actually transfer the risk but retained it through explicit guarantees and instead 
increased the risk exposure. The co-exceedances also identify a period of apparent market 
resiliency (2003 – 2008) in which securitizations and bank linkages increased but the 
associated rise in systemic risks was not evident and thus hidden.  
The theoretical modelling explains this relationship between apparent market resiliency 
and systemic risks. We have shown that securitization and risk transfer leads to an 
increased probability of extreme events, i.e. no loss events with high probability and large 
loss events with low probability, and a decreased probability of intermediate events. In 
other words, securitization and risk transfer reduces marginal loss probabilities and 
increases joint loss probabilities. For high correlations of the entities involved in 
securitization, the intermediate events even disappear explaining what we call “seeming 
resiliency”, i.e. the small-losses with high-probability occurrences are assumed to imply 
intermediate-losses with low probability whilst the risk of an extremely large and systemic 
loss event is not considered.  
We argued that the shadow banking system may enhance the stability of the financial 
system if it shares and diversifies risks in an efficient manner. Given its size, it is very 
likely that it can diversify risks and then absorb shocks more efficiently. However, its 
opacity also poses a risk as concentrations of risks and unknown linkages and channels of 
transmission cannot be readily identified. 
Given the limited information that regulators seem to have about the size of the shadow 
banking system more research is needed to reduce the “shadowy” nature of the system 
and to better understand the risks that are associated with known and unknown linkages 
and channels of shock transmission.  
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